Diferenças

Aqui você vê as diferenças entre duas revisões dessa página.

--- geopro:pedro:evolucao [2009/03/03 21:04] – pedro
+++ geopro:pedro:evolucao [2009/07/14 15:45] (atual) – pedro
@@ Linha 8: / Linha 8: @@
   * [[http://books.google.com/books?hl=pt-BR&lr=&id=ldmRTvHAFFQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA64&dq=autor:s-riechert+1981+games&ots=vzcIgSUCED&sig=RlIPXw_olX6RGR7KK90efhpO8nU#PPA65,M1|Game Theory and Animal Behaviour]]
   * [[http://www.springer.com/computer/artificial/journal/10458|Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems]]
-  * [[http://www.conferences.hu/AAMAS2009/science.html|AAMAS-2009]]
+  * [[http://cress.soc.surrey.ac.uk/essa2009/|ESSA 2009]]
-  * [[http://www.aisb.org.uk/convention/aisb09/index.php|AISB-09]]
+=====EPIA/SSM 2009=====
+==== Reviewer 1 ====
+|Summary of paper |This paper studies the conditions where a population of agents reaches equilibrium in evolutionary game theory. An agent-based model is presented, where individuals compete for space using mixed strategies. The simulation of this model shows that the population’s mean strategy always converges to a stable state, close and above to the analytic equilibrium.|
+|Relevance to the track| Relevant to the Track|
+|Comments on relevance to the track| This paper is relevant to the ABM issue "Agent-based experimental economics".|
+|Originality| Same thing has been done before|
+|Comments on originality| It is not clear the originality of the approach. The state of the art concerns mainly the description of theoretical background in non-cooperative games, Nash equilibrium and Evolutionary Stable Strategies. However, it would have been interesting to reference other work, proposing some Social Simulation approach complementary to the analytic studies in Evolutionary Game Theory.|
+|Literature awareness| Good but missing a few references|
+|Comments on literature awareness|See previous comment.|
+|Scientific/technical soundness| Basically okay|
+|Significance of results| Paper will moderately influence researchers close to the area|
+|Comments on significance of results| Clearly interesting approach for Evolutionary Game Theory researchers.|
+|Clarity of presentation|Basically okay|
+|Overall rating| Accept|
+|Reviewer confidence| I'm moderately familiar with this area|
+|Detailed comments| Section 1, page 2: "Memorizing the last results is not practicable within this model, since the agent may not have the same opponent in its next confront." - however, agents could have been designed to memorize and apply the well succeeded strategies, whoever the opponents are, improving this way their satisfaction. Section 5, 1st paragraph: "The parameters chosen were: 3 as the number of descendants, 0.1% as the chance of mutation, and ±0.1 as the change in the inherited strategy, with 50% of probability of each, once the mutation is activated." - why these initial parameters? It lacks some explanation about these choices.|
+==== Reviewer 2 ====
+|Summary of paper| The paper studies a model of evolutionary games on a grid. Agents compete when they are located in the same cell, through a chicken game. Each agent has a strategy defined by its probability to escalate or not. When the satisfaction of an agent is below a threshold, it moves to a random neighbouring cell. When the satisfaction of the agent is below another threshold, the agent leaves the game. The agents which are still in the game after a given number of time steps create several offspring which inherit the strategy of their father, with some mutation rate. The simulations show that the stationary state of the system include several strategies, and that the diversity of these strategies is higher when the mutation rate is high. This result is much richer than the theoretical stationary state in the standard game which includes only one strategy.|
+|Relevance to the track| Relevant to the Track|
+|Comments on relevance to the track| I think that the paper fits well the Social Simulation and Modelling track|
+|Originality |A direct extension of existing work|
+|Literature awareness| Clear specification of relation to rest of field|
+|Scientific/technical soundness|Basically okay|
+|Comments on scientific/technical soundness| I think the paper is globally technically sound. The simulations are convincing. See global comments for more details.|
+|Significance of results| Paper will moderately influence researchers close to the area|
+|Clarity of presentation|Basically okay|
+|Comments on clarity of presentation| Maybe some pesudocode of the basic dynamics would complete well the description. There are a few typos and bugs remaining in the text.|
+|Overall rating |Accept|
+|Reviewer confidence|I'm very familiar with this area|
+|Detailed comments|Interesting paper with clear results. Two criticisms however: - I think it is probably possible to derive an analytical model which predicts the proportion of strategies at the stationary state. To do this, you need to write the master equation ruling the fluxes between the different strategies, and I don't see any major difficulty for getting at least a good approximation of this. Thus the affirmation that the result is only achievable through explicit simulation seems a bit dangerous to me.- the description of the local and global satisfactions, and their evolution lacks precision. Minor remark: In section 2, I don't understand the difference between pa (pb) and sa (sb). |
+==== Reviewer 3 ====
+|Summary of paper| The paper presents an evolutionary extension of a previous work on a game played in a grid. The paper gives preliminary results on the experimentation showing a convergence towards the theoretical equilibrium in the context of the game when playing the 'chicken' payoff matrix.|
+|Relevance to the track|Relevant to the Track|
+|Comments on relevance to the track| The paper presents a number of experiments in full detail. It is a simulation of behaviour although the|
+|Originality |A direct extension of existing work|
+|Comments on originality|The results are rather straightforward and largely result of the parameters choses. e.g. +-0.1 in the mutation determines how close the curve is to the theoretical equilibrium. If using the complete [0,1] range, the simulations would have shown an almost perfect equilibrium.|
+|Literature awareness|Clear specification of relation to rest of field|
+|Scientific/technical soundness| Basically okay|
+|Significance of results| Paper will moderately influence researchers close to the area|
+|Clarity of presentation| Beautifully clear|
+|Comments on clarity of presentation|Very nicely written paper.|
+|Overall rating |Neutral|
+|Reviewer confidence| I'm moderately familiar with this area|
+|Detailed comments| The paper is a natural extension of the basic model allowing for an evolutionary approach very similar to the extansion that Axelrod did over the basic game to make it evolutionary. The paper is in that respect correct. However the results are very straightforward and differently from Axelrod's results, the experiments basically show that the game tends to the equilibrium. The fitness function 'determines' the solution and in that respect there is not much to be learned from the paper. The suggested changes for future work as expressed in the conclusion would not produce any non-expected result. The main conclusion that the convergence is 'over' the equilibrium is an artefact of the parameters used.|
 =====SNAMAS 2009=====