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--- geopro:pedro:gamesongrids [2008/02/19 14:56] – 150.163.67.167
+++ geopro:pedro:gamesongrids [2008/02/26 22:18] (atual) – 150.163.67.167
@@ Linha 1: / Linha 1: @@
 ====== Games on Grids ======
+====Prisoner's dilemma and clusters on small-world networks====
+|X. Thibert-Plante, L. Parrott, 2007| Complexity 12(6)22-36|
+\\
+**Abstract:** The structure of interaction plays an important role in the outcome of evolutionary games. This study investigates the evolution of stochastic strategies of the prisoner's dilemma played on structures ranging from lattices to small world networks. Strategies and payoffs are analyzed as a function of the network characteristics of the node they are playing on. Nodes with lattice-like neighborhoods tend to perform better than the nodes modified during the rewiring process of the construction of the small-world network.
+\\
@@ Linha 34: / Linha 43: @@
 Each additional benefit may be discounted or synergistically enhanced by a factor w. [Forçando a barra para a cooperação? FIXME: Verificar no artigo]
-====The geometrical patterns of cooperation evolution in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma: An intra-group model====
-|R. O. S. Soares and A. S. Martine, 2006| Physica|[[http://leg.ufpr.br/~pedro/papers/physica/soares_geometrical_patterns_pd_06.pdf|pdf]]|
-\\
-**Abstract:** The prisoner’s dilemma (PD) deals with the behavior conflict between two agents, who can either cooperate
-(cooperators) or defect. If both agents cooperate (defect), they have a unitary (null) payoff. Otherwise the payoff is T for the defector and null for the cooperator. The temptation T to defect is the only free parameter in the model. Here the agents are represented by the cells of a LxL lattice. The agent behaviors are initially randomly distributed according to an initial proportion of cooperators Pc(0). Each agent has no memory of previous behaviors and plays the PD with his/her eight nearest neighbors. At each generation, the considered agent copies the behavior of those who have secured the highest payoff. Once the PD conflict has been established (1<T<2), this system shows that cooperation among agents may emerge even for reasonably high T values giving rise to the well-known strategy: join to conquer, fight to share. Contrary to previous studies, in which the lattice cells are viewed as groups and are allowed to self-interact (inter-group situation), here the cells are viewed as individuals and are not allowed to self-interact (intra-group situation). Although the short time and asymptotic behavior of Pc are similar in both cases, the intermediate behavior is different. Oscillations in the intra-group Pc(t) forbids data collapse. The cooperators clusters geometrical configurations are distinct between inter and intra-group models, which explains the Pc(t)
-differences.
-\\
 ====The Arithmetics of Mutual Help====
-|M. A. Nowak, R. M. May and K. Sigmund, 1995| Scientific American|
+|M. A. Nowak, R. M. May and K. Sigmund, 1995| Scientific American| [[http://www.leg.ufpr.br/~pedro/papers/sciam/SciAm95a.pdf|pdf]]|
-{{ http://www.leg.ufpr.br/~pedro/figures/cooperators-generations.jpg}}
+{{ http://www.leg.ufpr.br/~pedro/figures/cooperators-generations.jpg?300}}
+\\
 But what of the creatures, such as many invertebrates, that seem to exhibit
@@ Linha 64: / Linha 66: @@
 a few neighbours on a two-dimensional grid. Such "spatial games" are very recent.
 They give an altogether new twist to the Prisoner's Dilemma.
+\\
+====The geometrical patterns of cooperation evolution in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma: An intra-group model====
+|R. O. S. Soares and A. S. Martine, 2006| Physica|[[http://leg.ufpr.br/~pedro/papers/physica/soares_geometrical_patterns_pd_06.pdf|pdf]]|
+\\
+**Abstract:** The prisoner’s dilemma (PD) deals with the behavior conflict between two agents, who can either cooperate
+(cooperators) or defect. If both agents cooperate (defect), they have a unitary (null) payoff. Otherwise the payoff is T for the defector and null for the cooperator. The temptation T to defect is the only free parameter in the model. Here the agents are represented by the cells of a LxL lattice. The agent behaviors are initially randomly distributed according to an initial proportion of cooperators Pc(0). Each agent has no memory of previous behaviors and plays the PD with his/her eight nearest neighbors. At each generation, the considered agent copies the behavior of those who have secured the highest payoff. Once the PD conflict has been established (1<T<2), this system shows that cooperation among agents may emerge even for reasonably high T values giving rise to the well-known strategy: join to conquer, fight to share. Contrary to previous studies, in which the lattice cells are viewed as groups and are allowed to self-interact (inter-group situation), here the cells are viewed as individuals and are not allowed to self-interact (intra-group situation). Although the short time and asymptotic behavior of Pc are similar in both cases, the intermediate behavior is different. Oscillations in the intra-group Pc(t) forbids data collapse. The cooperators clusters geometrical configurations are distinct between inter and intra-group models, which explains the Pc(t)
+differences.
+\\
 ====Prisoner's Dilemma Game with Heterogeneous Influential Effect on Regular Small-World Networks====