Tabela de conteúdos
Evolution and the Theory of Games
| John Maynard Smith, 1982 |
Introduction
The criterion of rationality is replaced by that of population dynamics and stability, and the criterion of self-interest by Darwinian-fitness. Most of the applications of evolutionary game theory in this book are directed towards animal contests and sexual allocation. (p. 2)
An obvious weakness of the game-theoretic approach to evolution is that it places great emphasis on equilibrium states, whereas evolution is a process of continuous, or at least periodic, change. (p. 8)
I think it would be a mistake […] to stick too rigidly to the criterion of falsifiability when judging theories in population biology. For example, Volterra's equations for the dynamics of a predator and prey species are hardly falsifiable. In a sense they are manifestly false, since they make no allowance for the age structure, for spatial distribution, or for many other necessary features of real situations. Their merit show that even the simplest possible model of such an interaction leads to sustained oscillation - a conclusion it would have been hard to reach by purely verbal reasoning. If, however, one were to apply this idea in a particular case, […] that would be an empirically falsifiable hypothesis. (p. 9)
The Basic Model
The essential features of this model are:
- the population is infinite
- reproduction is asexual
- pairwise contests take place between two opponents
- the opponents do not differ in any way discernible to themselves before contest starts (symmetric contests)
- finite set of alternative strategies
An ESS is a strategy such that, if all members of a population adopt it, then no mutant strategy could invade the population under the influence of natural selection.
Learning the ESS
The idea behind a CSS is simply that the connection between generations may be cultural rather than genetics