Primeiro trimestre:

1. ler artigos JAR
2. ler artigos miguel ABM empirico
3. preparar curso de aRT (revisar todos os docs)
4. artigo terrame JASSS:
   1. implementacao dos tres modelos
   2. videos dos tres modelos
   3. escrever artigo
5. ler os principais papers dos membros do PC do PWSS.

09/06 a 13/06: 100/100

1. HIV
2. Tobler
3. Brondizio + apresentacao
4. LUCC workshop

26/05 a 30/05: 92/100

1. Desmatamento na Amazônia: um diálogo necessário. É possível?
2. Land Cover in the Amazon Estuary: Linking of the Thematic Mapper with Botanical and Historical Data
3. Agent-Based Simulation of Household Decision Making and Land Use Change near Altamira, Brazil
4. Colonist household decisionmaking and land-use change in the Amazon Rainforest: an agent-based simulation
5. curso roberto

19/05 a 23/05: 87/100

1. tipping point
2. curso roberto

12/05 a 16/05: 85/100

1. agent analyst (x2)
2. cellular geography - Tobler
3. Social and Geographic Distance in HIV Risk - Rothenberg
4. curso roberto

5/05 a 09/05: 80/100

1. the spatial structure of networks, gastner and newmann
2. redes e conectividades xingu-iriri: geografia
3. identity and search social networks: watts et al
4. social networks different from others: newmann
5. networks on the web

21/04 a 25/04: 75/80

1. chapter agents russell norving
2. friendship and geography: liben-nowell
3. brian arthur presentation: nonequilibrium economics
4. networks internet
5. stanley milgram: the milgram experiment of obedience
6. granovetter: the strong of weak ties
7. wolfram: a new kind of science, 3 chapters
8. aulas agentes disciplina gilberto x2

14/04 a 18/04: 64/80

1. cadeia: rene
2. modelagem: ana paula

06/04 a 10/04: 62/80

1. goodlucc giovana
2. seminario CAP 23

31/03 a 04/04: 60/80

1. The Elemenst of Style: Elementary principles of composition
2. Finished 'The Elements of Style' x2
3. is this number your liking?
4. curso Trevor
5. A Common Protocol for Agent-Based Social Simulation
6. Is religion an evolutionary adaptation?

24/03 a 28/03: 53/60

1. The Elements of Style: Elementary rules of usage
2. chap 3, approaches to modelling in GIS: batty
3. chap 6, linking dynamic simulation models with GIS: miller
4. chap 18, interaction between humans and animals
5. PRESENTATION
6. higher level programming
7. seminario CAP 22

17/03 a 21/03: 46/55

1. Complexity, creativity and computers (complexity international)
2. seminario CAP 21

10/03 a 15/03: 44/50

1. zones of cooperation in the demographic prisoner's dilemma, epstein generative social science
2. learning to be thoughless, eptstein generative social science
3. integration ABM-LUCC/GIS, prospects and challenges
4. water dynamics, ducroft USP - computers, environment and urban sysyems

03/03 a 07/03: 40/45

1. artigo aluno do Tiago
2. transition potential modeling for land-cover change

25/02 a 29/02: 38/40

1. Gibson scale
2. The work of John Nash in Game Theory
3. Non-Cooperative games, Thesis
4. Slantchev, Game Theory: Dominance, Nash Equilibrium, Symmetry
5. chap 1, Evolution and the Theory of Games

18/02 a 22/02: 33/35

1. The Arithmetics of Mutual Help, Scientific American
2. The Replicator Equation on Graphs, Ohtsuki, JTB
3. Causes of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon: a qualitative comparative analysis
4. multiagent systems, munindar singh
5. chap 2, TGEB

11/02 a 15/02: 28/30

1. GIS data USA paper
2. Crop Yield Gap Concept to Food Security, thesis
3. PRESENTATION
4. empirical methods ABM-LUCC, JLUS
5. chap 4 GOL: random drift and chain reactions

04/02 a 08/02: 23/25

1. pw anderson: more is different, science
2. chap 3 GOL - population echology and chaos
3. chap 7 generative: retirement, bounded rationality and networks
4. groups of agents with a leader, giliotta, JASSS
5. chap 8 generative: energence of classes
6. geoinfo dynamic coupling paper

28/01 a 01/02: 17/20

1. chap 3 evolutionary dynamics: fitness landscapes and sequence spaces
2. chap 4 evolutionary dynamics: evolutionary games
3. chap 5 evolutionary dynamics: prisoners of the dilemma
4. chap 6 evolutionary dynamics: finite populations
5. chap 8 evolutionary dynamics: evolutionary graph theory
6. chap 9 evolutionary dynamics: spatial games

21/01 a 25/01: 11/15

1. geosimulation paper, benenson and torrens
2. chap 1 generative
3. chap 2 generative - remarks
4. chap 3 generative - non-explanatory equilibria
5. chap 2 GOL - artificial life
6. chap 2 evolutionary dynamics: What evolution is

14/01 a 18/01: 5/10

1. introduction; generative social science
2. introduction; games of life
3. artigo terrame Gilberto
4. Swarming methods for geospatial reasoning; Parunak; IJGIS

06/01 a 11/01: 1/5

1. introduction: gteb, von neumann morgenstern

All of Statistics (A concise course in Statistical Inference). Larry Wasserman. Springer, 2004

GELL-MANN M (1994) The Quark and the Jaguar. New York: Freeman and Company.

A Software Interface Between System Dynamics and Agent-Based Simulations–Linking Vensim and RePast

BONABEAU E (2002) “Agent-Based Modeling: Methods and Techniques for Simulating Human Systems.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 99, pp. 7280-7287.

BANKES S C (2002) “Tools and Techniques for Developing Policies for Complex and Uncertain Systems.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 99, pp. 7263-7266.

PARUNAK H V D, Savit R, and Riolo R L (1998) “Agent-Based Modeling vs. Equation-Based Modeling: A Case Study and Users' Guide.” In Workshop on Multi-Agent Systems and Agent-Based Simulation, Springer, pp. 10-25.

LEOMBRUNI, R., Richiardi, M.G. (2005) Why are Economists Sceptical About Agent-Based Simulations?, Physica A. Vol.355, No. 1, pp. 103-109.

Finding Optimal Agent-Based Models - B KLEMENS. Center on Social and Economic Dynamics Working Paper No. 49

Foster, Dean and Young 2001. on the impossibility of predicting the behavior of rational agents PNAS 98(22) 12848-53

Jordan 93. Three problems in learning mixed-strategy equilibria GEB 5:368-86

http://www.econ.fea.usp.br/kadota/EAE522-Programa.htm

KADOTA, D. K. ; PRADO, E. F. S. ; SOROMENHO, J. E. C. . Scale and externalities in an evolutionary game model. Estudos Econômicos (IPE/USP), São Paulo, v. 31, n. 3, p. 529-550, 2001.

artigos do paper de transferencia de tecnologia

http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/6/2/5.html

http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/6/2/2.html

http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/6/3/5.html

path dependence

BONABEAU E, Dorigo M and Theraulaz G (1999) Swarm Intelligence: From Natural to Artificial Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

DORAN J., Palmer M (1995) The EOS Project: Integrating two models of Paleolithic social change. In N. Gilbert, R. Conte (eds.) Artificial Societies. London: UCL Press..

Robert May, 1976 Simple mathematical models with very complicated dynamics

Jordan, J. S. 1993 Three problems in learning mixed-strategy equilibria GEB 5:368-86

Gimblett, H. R. 2002 Integrating geographic information systems and agent-based modeling techniques for simulating social and ecological processes, SFI Studies in the Sciences of Complexity. (ABM has grown in popularity in many fields, including GIS)

Kirman and Vriend, 1998 - epstein generative social science chap 1 Evolving Market Structure: A model of price dispersion and loyalty Working paper, University of London

Arthur and LeBaron and Palmer and Tayler, 1997 - epstein generative social science chap 1 Asset Pricing under endogenous expectations in an artificial stocial market The Economy as a complex evolving system II

Capitulo dos jogos bayesianos e dos outros homos sem ser o economicus

Aumann, Robert J. [1974]: Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1, 67-96.

Aumann, Robert J. [1976]: Agreeing to Disagree, Annals of Statistics, 4, 1236-1239.

Aumann, Robert J. [1987]: Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality, Econometrica, 55, 1-18.

Aumann, Robert J. [1987]: Game Theory, in “The new Palgrave Dictionary of Economics”, (editors: J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman), Macmillan, Londra, 460-482. An interesting introduction to game theory

Border, Kim [1985]: Fixed Point Theorems with Applications to Economics and Game Theory, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge. Good reference for fixed points and their applications in game theory and economics

Dunford, Nelson, and Jacob T. Schwartz [1958]:Linear operators, Interscience, New York (NY). A classical reference for functional analysis and measure theory

Glicksberg, Irving L. [1952]: A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points, Proc. Amer. Math. Soc., 3, 170-174. Extension of Nash's theorem to the case of infinite sets of pure strategies (spaces with compact sets of pure strategies and continuous payoffs)

Harsanyi, John C. [1968]: Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players, Parts I, II and III, Management Science, 14, 159-182, 320-334, 486-502. The famuous three papers in which Harsanyi introduces his model for games with incomplete information

Hildenbrand, Werner [1974]: Core and Equilibria for a Large Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ). A reference for games with an infinite set of players.

Kakutani, Shizuo [1941]: A Generalization of Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, Duke Math. J., 8, 457-458. The fixed point theorem used for the proof of existence for Nash equilibria (for mixed extensions of finite games)

Klein, Erwin and Anthony C. Thompson [1984]: Theory of correspondences, Wiley, New York. A good reference for correspondences and topologies on ``hyperspaces'' (sets of subsets of a topological space). With applications to game theory and mathematical economics

Kreps, David Mark [1990]: A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York. A good reference for use of game theory in microeconomics.

Luce, R. Duncan and Howard Raiffa [1957]: Games and Decisions, Wiley, New York. A classic reading, still extremely interesting.

Myerson, Roger B. [1991]: Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA). A very good general reference.

von Neumann, John [1928]: Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele, Matematische Annalen, 100, 295-320; english translation: “On the Theory of Games of Strategy”, in “Contributions to the Theory of Games”, n. IV, 13-42, 1959; see also: “Collected Works”, vol. VI. The “minimax” theorem.

von Neumann, John [1937]: Über ein ökonomisches Gleichungssystem und eine Verallgemeinerung der Brouwer'schen Fixpunktsatzes, Ergebnisse eines Math. Kolloquiums, 8, 73-83.

The growth model of von Neumann.

von Neumann, John and Oskar Morgenstern [1944]: Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1944; second edition (with appendix on axiomatic foundations of expected utility): 1947; third edition: 1953. The birth of game theory.

Osborne, Martin and Ariel Rubinstein [1994]: A course in Game Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA). A very good general reference.

Further references and suggested readings

Aumann, Robert J. e Sergiu Hart: Handbook of Game Theory, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1992, 1994. A collection of surveys on “all” fields of game theory.

Binmore, Ken: Fun and games, Heath and Company, Lexington (MA), 1992. A general reference.

Fishburn, Peter C.: Utility Theory for Decision Making, Krieger, Huntington (NY), 1979. A standard reference for preferences and utilities.

French, Simon: Decision Theory, Ellis Horwood, New York, 1993. Quite readable introduction to decision theory.

Fudenberg, Drew e Jean Tirole: Game Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA), 1991. Only non-cooperative games. Very rich of examples, especially in economics

Kreps, David M. [1988]: Notes on the theory of choice, Westview press, Boulder (CO). A nice reference for decision theory

Ichiishi, Tatsuro: Game Theory for Economic Analysis, Academic Press, New York, 1983. Mathematically oriented.

Owen, Guillermo: Game Theory, III edition, Academic Press, New York, 1995. A good general reference. In particular for cooperative games.

Shubik, Martin: Game Theory in the Social Sciences: Concepts and Solutions, The MIT Press, Cambridge (MA), 1982. Very intersting for applications of game theory to the social sciences.